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Abstract
SMEs play an important role in Chinese economy, 
and along with the launch of China GEM, the pressure 
of SMEs financing will be reduced. This research 
established simultaneous equations of capital structure 
and corporation performance, applicant INN to estimate 
the equation and then find out the interactive relationship 
between capital structure and corporation performance. 
The results show that capital structure and corporation 
performance exist interactive relationship and capital 
structure, growth ability, equity concentration, board and 
corporation scale will significantly influence corporation 
performance. Profitability, growth ability, debt paying 
ability, collateral value of assets and enterprise scale will 
significantly influence capital structure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As the most active part of China’s national economy，
SMEs play an important role in job creation, economy 
and the national economic structure stability. Recently, 
the proportion of SMEs account for 99.17% of total 
enterprises, while SMEs provide nearly 80 percent of 
resident’s employment, 70% of innovations comes from 
SMEs (Su, 2014). Other than that, SMEs show the amazing 
ability to promote economic and technological innovation. 
In 2009, China officially launched the GEM market. As an 
effective complement to the motherboard market, the GEM 
is very important for improving liquidity and efficiency, 
especially for resolving the problem of financing for SMEs.
However, because of the launch of the China GEM 
market is not long, the system is not as mature as some 
developed countries. In the process of executing, the 
China GEM market gradually exposed some problems 
such as high issue price, high price-earnings ratio, 
higher oversubscription proportion etc. (Zhao & Sun, 
2012). On the other hand, in the China GEM market, the 
phenomenon of senior executives’ monetize is growing, 
indicating that the current system is not perfect, listed 
company’s capital structure is unreasonable.
In China, the interactive relationship between capital 
structure and corporate performance in SMEs should 
combine the actual situation of China’s GEM listed 
companies. From previous studies, we can see that the 
capital structure is an important factor affecting business 
performance, but such studies do not reach a uniform 
conclusion. By analyzing of some listed corporations 
in China GEM market, this research establishes the 
simultaneous equations model of capital structure and 
corporate performance, applicant GMM estimation to 
estimate the simultaneous equations, to investigate the 
relationship between GEM Capital Structure and Corporate 
Performance. Therefore, there will be some suggestions 
benefit for improving corporation financing efficiency and 
effectiveness of the management decisions and enhancing 
performance of listed companies accordingly.
1.  LITERATURE REVIEW
At the aspect of relationship between capital structure 
and company performance, in early 1952, Durand 
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summarized three theories of capital structure: net 
theory, net operating income theory and traditional 
compromise theory. Then Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
proposed the famous MM theorem stated that there is no 
optimal capital structure. Once the capital market is fully 
effective, capital structure and corporate value will be 
not associated. The MM theory is the bases of modern 
capital structure theory. From then on, some economists 
also reached many other achievements. Other than deep 
study on capital structure, they also pay attention to 
find out influence factors and optimal capital structure 
etc. They proposed many theories including trade-off 
theory, agency theory, signal theory etc. to analyze the 
relationship between capital structure and corporate 
value from varieties prospective. 
However, in reality, some assumptions MM theory 
used is un-valid. Hence, Myers (1989) proposed static 
trade-off theory on the basis of MM theory. This theory 
takes the bankruptcy costs and agency costs of debt into 
consideration. It stated that debt financing can reach 
tax avoidance, but also contribute to the costs and risks 
increase. If the amount of tax avoidance is larger than 
cost risks, corporate should add debt financing to achieve 
optimal capital structure; other than that, corporate should 
avoid adding debt. Thereafter, the optimal capital structure 
means corporations’ tax avoidance is the same as cost and 
risk of debt financing. 
Based on MM theory, tradeoff theory takes the 
bankruptcy costs and tax avoidance benefits into 
consideration, but this theory pay more attention to the 
external factors and ignore internal factors, which means 
the explanation is not so reasonable. Then, signaling 
theory considers the internal factors and believe that 
there exists asymmetry of information between internal 
managers and outside investors. Managers can transfer 
single through capital structure when choose the 
financing structure. And investors can judge value of this 
firm accordingly. Then Ross (1977) examined the asset-
liability ratio and stated there is positive correlation 
between asset-liability ratio and enterprise value. Brealey 
and Pyle (1977) believed investor should reference the 
proportion of shareholding enterprise managers has. The 
more the proportion, the higher the enterprise value. 
Lease et al. (1991) showed that stock prices will rise 
with debt transfer into equity, while decline when equity 
transfer into debt. Shah (2004) proved the financial 
leverage and the company stock price have a positive 
relationship. 
After the trade-off theory, agency theory and signaling 
theory, Myers and Majluf (1984) presented the pecking 
order theory. They believed that the separation of 
management and ownership will lead to asymmetric 
information. Therefore, internal employees are superiority 
than external investors, and the best way is internal 
financing because the external financing will create costs. 
Other than that, many scholars also proved that 
business growth opportunities and corporate debt levels 
have a significant negative correlation (Smith & Watts, 
1992). 
Along MM Theory, Jensen and Meckling (1979) raised 
the capital structure contract theory. This theory provides 
the allocation of residual claims and corporate control. 
The principal-agent theory and signaling theory explain 
the distribution of residual claims, and control theory 
explains the problem of corporate control distribution. 
Then, Aghion and Bolton (1992) studied the control 
power between managers and investors and believed 
that debt financing and equity financing are different, the 
creditors have priority claim when corporate bankrupt. 
Therefore, they believed the optimal capital structure 
should be shareholders bear minimum losses at the time 
of bankruptcy.
Based on the theoretical technology, many scholars did 
relevant empirical study to further analyze the relationship 
between capital structure and corporation value. Generally, 
factors influence capital structure including both external 
and internal factors. Compared to external factors such 
as macroeconomic situation, trade and economic policies 
etc., more studies focus on internal factors. Korajczyk 
and Levy (2003) studied how macroeconomic impact 
capital structure, and found if there is no constraints, 
corporation is more interesting in equity financing in the 
period of economic expansion, and more interested in debt 
financing when economic contraction. For corporations 
have financing constraints, results are opposite. From 
the internal factors, Berger and Udell (2006) proved that 
increasing corporate debt ratio can cut down agency costs 
related to equity. If managers of corporation is sensitive 
to salaries, they will focus on reasonable tax avoidance, 
which will benefit for corporation performance (Minnick 
& Noga, 2010). Other than that, the number of board 
members will also influence firm performance, some 
proved they have negative relationship (Yermack, 1996), 
some proved they do not have simple liner relationship. 
When the number is less than 6, they have no significant 
relationship, but if more than 6, they have significant 
negative relationship (Bennedsen et al., 2008). 
However, above empirical studies commonly adopted 
single equation model, and did not take the interaction 
between corporate performance and capital structure into 
consideration, which will cause biases and inconsistent 
when using regression coefficients evaluation. Hence, this 
research will use simultaneous equations to analyze, and 
aim at finding some more interesting result. 
2.  VARIABLE SELECTION
2.1  Firm Performance
Firm performance could be measured based on finance 
perspective or market perspective. From finance 
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perspective, there are lots of methods to evaluate the 
financial performance of a company such as EVA. 
Although the finance performance could be better 
reflected by these comprehensive method, they may 
use some variables that the related to capital structure. 
This may lead to low meaning of regression results. 
Therefore a simple but widely used index, return on 
equity (ROE), is chosen as the proxy variable for firm 
performance.
2.2  Capital Structure
There are different views on capital structure. Some 
argue that capital structure is the structure of company’s 
long term capital resource. They usually choose the ratio 
of long term debt to equity capital as proxy variable. 
Others think that the capital structure of a company 
does not confine to long term capital but should also 
include short term capital source. They usually choose 
the ratio of debt to assets. Companies listed on GEM are 
quite different from other listed companies. They tend 
to be young and doesn’t have long term debt. So asset 
debt ratio (DAR) is a proper proxy variable for capital 
structure in this study.
2.3  Control Variables
According to the literature review above, the company 
performance may be influenced by several other factors, 
including growth potential, company size and structure, 
growth potential, and ownership structure while capital 
structure may be influenced by firm performance, growth 
potential, equity ownership structure, and assets structure. 
Several control variables are selected to make the model 
more complete, including:
Growth potential (GP) is measured by sales growth 
rate. Inertia often exists for company growth. A company 
with heath growth rate tends to perform well in a certain 
time period.
Board size (B_SIZE) is measured by the number 
of board members. Board size may pose influence on 
company operation and thus affect firm performance.
Collateral value of assets (CVO) is measured by 
(inventory + fixed asset / total assets. When borrowing, 
lender would usually ask for collaterals in case the 
borrower doesn’t  have the abil i ty of repayment 
in the future. So CVO may pose limits on capital 
structure.
Firm size (C_SIZE) is measured by the logarithm 
of the firm’s assets. Companies with bigger size 
tend to possess stronger ability against risk and have 
better negotiation power which may increase the firm 
performance. On the other hand bigger company is harder 
to manage, so company performance may be negatively 
influenced (Williamson, 1967). 
Ownership structure is measured by the sum of 
shareholding ratio of first three biggest shareholder (CR3). 
In general, high concentration of shareholding should 
have positive influence on firm performance (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Short, 1994; 
Jirapon & Gleason, 2007). 
3.  MODELLING 
Based on variables we choose, the model of this study is 
built as follows:
ROEi=C1i+a1iDARi+b1iGPi+c1iCR3i+d1iC_SIZEi+e1iB_
SIZEi+ε1i .
DARi=C2i+a2iROEi+b2iGPi+c2iCOVi+d2iCR3i+ε2i .
Where C is constant; Variables are shown in the table 
below:
Table 1
Variable Definition
Variable names Variable signs Variable definition 
Firm performance ROE Net profit/equity
Capital structure DAR Total debt/total assets
Growth potential GP Growth rate of sales
Board size B_SIZE Logarithm of numbers of members in board
Collateral value of assets COV (Stock + fixed assets)/total assets
Firm size C-SIZE Logarithm of total assets
Ownership structure CR3
S u m  o f  s h a r e h o l d i n g 
ratio of first 3 biggest 
shareholder
3.1  Sampling
As reporting data may be manipulated by the company 
in their first year on the growth enterprise market, 
all companies listed on the growth enterprise market 
before 2013 are chosen samples of this study. Based 
on the annual report of these companies in 2013, Data 
needed for this study are collected. Then, Companies 
with abnormal data or lacking parts of data are 
eliminated. After the preprocessing, 367 companies 
stay in our sample. The descriptive statistics are as 
follows:
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics
Varable names Variable signs N Minium Maximum Mean St.dev
Firm 
performance ROE 367 0.0022 0.2134 0.0851 0.0423
Capital structure DAR 367 0.0213 0.7851 0.1783 0.1521
Growth potential GP 367 -0.2341 1.6423 0.3531 0.3124
Board size B_SIZE 367 1.7042 2.6431 2.1319 0.1941
Collateral value 
of assets COV 367 0.0084 0.6521 0.2341 0.2396
Firm size C-SIZE 367 19.8512 22.4512 20.9123 0.5212
Ownership 
structure CR3 367 0.1632 0.8723 0.5182 0.1392
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3.2  Empirical Result 
Generalized method of moments (GMM) method is 
applied to estimate coefficients in the model. Regression 
result is showed as follows:
Table 3 
Result of GMM (ROE as Explained Variable)
Variable Coefficient Std. error Prob.
C -0.2948 0.0341 0.0152***
DAR -0.5721 0.0752 0.0000***
GP 0.0504 0.0412 0.0000***
B_SIZE -0.0563 0.0386 0.1721
C-SIZE 0.0162 0.0583 0.0065***
CR3 0.1026 0.1731 0.0458***
R-squared 0.2536
Adjusted R-squared 0.2408
Note.  *** means significant at 1% level, ** means significant at 5% 
level, * means significant at 10% level.
We could see from the result that there is a significant 
negative relationship between firm performance and 
capital structure. The coefficient is -0.5721. Such result 
is contrary to MM theory and signaling models which 
hold high debt to asset ratio would increase the firm 
performance. This may be due to the different policies of 
GEM in China compare to that of mature stock market. 
In the growth enterprise market in China, a verification 
system is adopted for companies which are going 
to be listed on the market. Companies who pass the 
verification may launch their IPOs in one and one short 
time period. Pursuing newly listed companies to become 
a common thing in China stock market which leads to 
oversubscription and thus low debt to assets ratio. 
Table 4 
Result of Gmm (Dar as Explained Variable) 
Variable Coefficient Std. error Prob.
C -1.4215 1.3773 0.0045***
ROE -4.6421 0.4968 0.0065***
GP 0.4153 0.0483 0.0054***
COV 0.2192 0.2056 0.0942*
CR3 0.0045 0.1849 0.3421
R-squared 0.1542
Adjusted R-squared 0.1472
Note. *** means significant at 1% level, ** means significant at 5% 
level, * means significant at 10% level.
From Table 4 we could see that a significant 
relationship exist between firm performance and debt 
to assets ratio, which suggests that well performed 
companies do not resort to outside capital. Such result is 
in line with the pecking order theory. Company prefers 
to choose internal financing rather than debt. Then due to 
the higher oversubscription proportion, companies would 
choose equity financing rather than debt. 
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there exists an interactive relationship 
between China GEM listed companies’ capital structure 
and firm performance. However, it cannot explain by 
single equation model but simultaneous equations can 
explain it clearly. When it comes to factors influence 
companies’ performance, capital structure, growth ability, 
equity concentration, board and corporation scale will 
work. At the aspect of capital structure, profitability, 
growth ability, debt paying ability, collateral value of 
assets and enterprise scale is very important. Other 
than that, the effect of the non-debt tax shield and first 
shareholders equity concentration is not so obvious. 
However, because of China GEM market is not mature, it 
has some problems such as high issue price, high price-
earnings ratio, higher oversubscription proportion etc.. 
Other than that, Chinese SMEs are more interesting 
in internal financing, equity financing other than debt 
financing, therefore, analysis of China GEM market 
should take the real situation of Chinese SMEs into 
consideration. 
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